Yves here. Turkiye does not want the Black Sea to become a Russian lake. But at what cost?
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website
Turkish Foreign Minister and former spy chief Hakan Fidan confirmed during a joint press conference with his Ukrainian counterpart that Turkiye will ensure Ukraine’s maritime security after the ongoing conflict ends. In his words, “Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding on this with our allies. Planning efforts on this issue are also being carried out by the naval forces of the relevant allied countries.” This represents a serious threat to Russian interests.
The form that it takes remains to be seen, but Turkiye might escort Ukrainian ships exporting grain even before the conflict ends after Russia’s “systematic strikes” took one-third of Ukraine’s export capabilities offline. According to Reuters, “agricultural exports like grains and vegetable oils remain Ukraine’s biggest source of foreign currency earnings”, and the proceeds hypothetically help pay off European loans. The European members of NATO therefore have a financial incentive to support any Turkish escort mission.
The US might also request this service of Turkiye as part of a quid pro quo over any potential F-35 sale. Trump recently decided to “escalate to de-escalate” with Russia so it follows that he might ask some of his country’s junior partners like Turkiye to do more of the “heavy lifting” in this regard. Turkiye is already part of the “cordon sanitaire” along Russia’s southern periphery in the South Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia as explained here so expanding it to include the Black Sea wouldn’t be surprising.
It would certainly be provocative from Russia’s perspective if it occurs during wartime, however, but whether or not Russia would strike Turkish ships at the risk of sparking World War III remains to be seen. The same goes for if Turkiye somehow or another tries to protect Ukrainian ports, such as if it deploys some of its fleet there on the pretext of “deterring” Russia from taking offline any more of Ukraine’s agricultural export capabilities, even if this is just a cover for protecting maritime military logistics.
The potential long-term implications of Turkiye guaranteeing Ukraine’s maritime security are even more concerning for Russia than the potential short-term ones during the ongoing conflict. The 1936 Montreux Convention limits foreign warships in the Black Sea to just nine, but NATO members Turkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania can have as many as they’d like since they border that body of water. The accelerated development of their naval capabilities in the coming years therefore can’t be ruled out.
NATO has long wanted to turn the Black Sea into a “NATO lake” just as some believe that it’s since done to the Baltic Sea following Finland and Sweden formal membership in the bloc after being shadow members thereof since the end of the Old Cold War. To that end, Turkiye might help Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine develop their naval forces across the coming years, with the goal being to collectively outmatch Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which has been degraded by Western-backed Ukrainian attacks.
Despite official rhetoric to the contrary, Turkiye indisputably poses a serious threat to Russian interests, one that’ll continue growing as it takes on more containment responsibilities in alignment with its role in the “cordon sanitaire”. Russia can therefore either accept this as the “new normal” and consequently agree to unilateral concessions, which would go against everything that the special operation was supposed to achieve, or compete with Turkiye across the entire southern front in defense of its interests.
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